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Abstract 
In previous work, we pointed out the limitations of 
standard Bayesian networks as a modeling framework 
for large, complex domains. We proposed a new, 
richly structured modeling language, Object-oriented 
Bayesian Networks, that we argued would be able to 
deal with such domains. However, it turns out that 
OOBNs are not expressive enough to model many in­
teresting aspects of complex domains: the existence of 
specific named objects, arbitrary relations between ob­
jects, and uncertainty over domain structure. These as­
pects are crucial in real-world domains such as battle­
field awareness. In this paper, we present SPOOK, an 
implemented system that addresses these limitations. 
SPOOK implements a more expressive language that 
allows it to represent the battlespace domain naturally 
and compactly. We present a new inference algorithm 
that utilizes the model structure in a fundamental way, 
and show empirically that it achieves orders of magni­
tude speedup over existing approaches. 
1 Introduction 
Bayesian networks are a graphical representation language 
in which complex probabilistic models can be represented 
compactly and naturally. The power of the representation 
comes from its ability to capture certain structure in the do­
main- the locality of influence among different attributes. 
This structure, which is formalized as probabilistic condi­
tional independence, is the key to the compact representa­
tion. It also supports effective inference algorithms. 
In previous work [KP97], we argued that, despite their 
power, Bayesian networks (BNs) are not adequate for deal­
ing with large complex domains. Such domains require 
an explicit representation of additional types of structure : 
the notion of an object, a complex structured domain en­
tity with its own properties; and the notion of a class of 
objects, that captures properties common to an entire set of 
similar objects. Our Object-Oriented Bayesian Networks 
(OOBNs) extended the language of BNs with these addi­
tional concepts. 
By introducing objects and classes, OOBNs provide us 
with a representation language that makes it much easier to 
specify large models in a compact and modular way. How­
ever, these new concepts also reveal the shortcomings of 
the OOBN framework. As soon as we have objects, we 
want to encode various relationships between them that go 
beyond part-whole. For example, we may have an object 
representing some physical location (with its own proper­
ties). We may well wish to assert that another object, such 
as a military unit, is at the location. This relation is not a 
part-whole relation, and thus does not fit naturally into the 
OOBN framework. 
In [KP98], we described a language that allows a much 
richer web of relations between objects. It also extends 
the expressive power of the language in several significant 
ways. For example, by making relations first-class citizens 
in our ontology, we can express knowledge we might have 
about them; just as importantly, we can express lack of 
knowledge about relations. For example, we can express 
the fact that we do not know which of several locations a 
unit is at; we can even quantify this uncertainty using prob­
abilities. We can also express uncertainty about the number 
of subunits that a unit has·. 
Although the additional expressive power provided by 
OOBNs and its extensions is natural and even desirable, 
one still needs to make the case that it actually helps model 
real-life domains. We need also to show that we have 
the capability to answer interesting queries using a rea­
sonable amount of computation. In this paper, we address 
both of these points. We present an implemented system 
called SPOOK- System for Probabilistic Object-Oriented 
Knowledge. We show that it can be used to represent and 
reason about a real-world complex domain. 
The domain we have chosen for this test is military situa­
tion assessment [ML96]. This domain is notoriously chal­
lenging for traditional Bayesian networks. It involves a 
large number of objects, related to each other in a variety 
of ways. There is also a lot of variability in the models 
appropriate to different situations. We started with a set of 
Bayesian networks constructed for this domain by lET, Inc. 
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We then used our SPOOK language to construct a single uni­
fied model for this domain, one with a rich class hierarchy. 
The resulting model was compact, modular, natural, and 
easy to build. 
We also investigate our ability to answer queries effectively 
using such a complex model. One approach (the one we 
proposed in [KP98]) is based on knowledge based model 
construction ( KBMC) [WBG92]- converting the complex 
model into a traditional BN, and using standard BN infer­
ence. The BNs constructed from a complex SPOOK model 
are large enough to stretch the limitations of existing in­
ference algorithms. Even the network for a single SCUD 
battalion involves over 1000 nodes and requires 20 minutes 
to answer a query. A network for many interacting units in 
a battles pace would be orders of magnitude larger. 
The challenges posed by real-life complex models require 
a more sophisticated approach to inference. In our origi­
nal OOBN paper [KP97], we described an inference algo­
rithm that makes use of the structure made explicit in the 
more expressive language: the encapsulation of one object 
within another, and the model reuse implied by the class 
hierarchy. The OOBN algorithm is too simple to apply to 
our much richer SPOOK language. However, it turns out 
that many of the same ideas can be adapted to this task. We 
present a new inference algorithm, implemented in the sys­
tem, that utilizes encapsulation and reuse in a fundamental 
way. We present experimental results for our algorithm 
on realistic queries over the battlespace model, and show 
that by utilizing encapsulation and model reuse, we obtain 
orders of magnitude speedup over the KBMC approach. 
2 The SPOOK Language 
In this section we review the SPOOK representation lan­
guage. The language presented here is based on the prob­
abilistic frame systems of [KP98]; it extends the language 
of object-oriented Bayesian networks (OOBNs) [KP97] in 
several important ways. 
The basic unit in the SPOOK language is an object. An ob­
ject has attributes, which may be either simple or complex. 
A simple attribute is a function from objects to values in 
some specified domain; it is similar to a variable in a stan­
dard BN. A complex attribute represents a relationship be­
tween objects. If the value of complex attribute A of object 
X is Y (notated X. A = Y ), the relation A( X, Y )  holds. 
Complex attributes may be single-valued, corresponding to 
functional relationships, or multi-valued, corresponding to 
general binary relations. A complex attribute may have an 
inverse: if the inverse of attribute A is B, andY is a value 
of X.A, then X must be a value ofY.B. 
For example, a scud-battalion object has a simple attribute 
under-fire, whose value ranges over { none,light, heavy}. 
It has a single-valued complex attribute at-location, whose 
value is an object corresponding to the location of the bat­
talion. It has a multi-valued complex attribute has-battery, 
each of whose values is a battery in the battalion. The 
has-battery attribute has an inverse in-battalion, which is 
a single-valued complex attribute of a battery object. If 
battery-! is a value of scud-battalion-charlie.has-battery, then 
battery-Lin-battalion = scud-battalion-charlie. The dot nota­
tion can be extended to attribute chains A1.A2. · · · .Ak. 
denoting the composition of the relations A1, ... , Ak. If 
A1, ... , Ak-! are single-valued complex attributes, and 
Ak is a simple attribute, we call the attribute chain simple. 
The probability model for an object is specified by defining 
a local probability model for each of its simple attributes. 
As in BNs, The local probability model consists of a set of 
parents, and a conditional probability distribution (CPO). A 
parent can be either another simple attribute of the same ob­
ject, or a simple attribute chain. Allowing attribute chains 
as parents provides a way for the attributes of an object to 
be influenced probabilistically by attributes of related ob­
jects. If two objects are inverses of each other, each can be 
influenced by the other. 
Continuing our example, the under-fire attribute of 
scud-battalion has a parent at-location.defense-support, and 
the CPO for under-fire indicates that the battalion is more 
likely to be under heavy fire if it is in a location with 
poor defense support. The battery object has a hit attribute 
whose parent is in-battalion.under-fire, thus creating an in­
direct chain of influence from the location, through the 
battalion at the location, to the battery in the battalion. 
Since in-battalion is an inverse of has-battery, the battalion 
can in turn be influenced by the battery it contains. For 
example the attribute scud-battalion.next-activity depends on 
has-battery .launch-capability. (Section 2.2 explains how to 
specify dependence on multi-valued attributes.) 
2.1 Classes and instances 
In SPOOK, a probability model is associated with a class, 
which corresponds to a type of entity in the domain. An 
instance of a class corresponds to a domain entity of 
the appropriate type, and derives its probability model 
from its class. We use object to denote either a class 
or an instance. For example, scud-battalion is a class and 
scud-battalion-charlie is an instance of scud-battalion. 
Classes provide reusable probability models, that can be 
applied to many different objects. Classes are organized in 
a class hierarchy. A subclass inherits the probability model 
of its superclass, and it can also override or extend it. The 
inheritance mechanism facilitates model reuse by allowing 
the commonalities between different classes to be captured 
in a common superclass. For example, the battalion super­
class captures those features common to all battalions. 
Classes also provide a type system for the SPOOK language. 
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Every complex attribute A has a type T(A), and for any 
object X, the value of X. A must be an instance ofT(A). If 
no particular value is specified for X . A, we use the unique 
names assumption, which states that the values of X. A are 
generic, unnamed instances ofT (A), that are not related in 
any other way to the instances in the model. 
The unique names assumption implies that in the class 
models, no two battalions can be at the same location. In­
stances provide a way to specify such webs of inter-related 
objects. In this example, there are two battalion instances, 
battalion-! and battalion-2, and a location instance location-a. 
By stating that battalion-l .at-location = location-a and that 
battalion-2.at-location = location-a, the objects are hooked to­
gether appropriately. 
2.2 Multi-valued attributes & structural uncertainty 
As discussed above, a complex attribute can be multi­
valued, but a parent of a simple attribute must be a simple 
attribute chain, in which the attributes are single-valued. In 
order to allow the attributes of an object to be influenced by 
attributes of related objects when the relationship is multi­
valued, we introduce a quantifier attribute. A quantifier 
attribute has the form #(A. p = v) , where A is a multi­
valued complex attribute, p is a simple attribute chain, and 
v is a possible value of p. If X is an object with attribute 
A, X. #(A. p = v) denotes the number of objects Y such 
that A(X, Y)  II Y. p = v. 
Quantifier attributes allow attributes of an object to depend 
on aggregate properties of a set of related objects. Con­
tinuing our running example, we may specify that a par­
ent of scud-battalion.next-mission is the quantifier attribute 
#(has-battery.launch-capability=high). The value of the quan­
tifier is determined by the value of launch-capability for each 
of the batteries in the battalion. If the set of batteries in the 
battalion is fixed, the quantifier simply expresses an aggre­
gate property of the set. However, we may also have uncer­
tainty over the number of batteries in the battalion. This is 
an example of structural uncertainty, which is uncertainty 
not only over the properties of objects in the model but over 
the relational structure of the model itself. 
The type of structural uncertainty encountered in this ex­
ample is number uncertainty: uncertainty over the number 
of values of a multi-valued complex attribute. Number un­
certainty is integrated directly into the probability model 
of an object using a number attribute. If A is a multi­
valued complex slot, the number attribute #A denotes the 
number of values of A. A number attribute is a standard 
random variable whose range is the set of integers from 0 
to some upper bound n. It can participate directly in the 
probability model like any other variable. In our exam­
ple, scud-battalion.#has-battery depends probabilistically on 
scud-battalion.country. Under number uncertainty, the value 
of a quantifier depends on the value of the number attribute, 
as well as on the values of the related objects. 
Another kind of structural uncertainty is reference uncer­
tainty, which is uncertainty over the value of a single­
valued complex attribute. For example, we may have un­
certainty over whether a battalion is located in a mountain 
or a desert location. As with number uncertainty, reference 
uncertainty can be introduced directly into the probability 
model of an object using a reference attribute. If A is a 
single-valued complex attribute whose value is uncertain, 
R( A) is a reference attribute whose range determines the 
possible values of A. An element of the range ofR(A) may 
either be a subclass C of T(A), or an instance I of T(A). 
If the value of X. R( A) is the type C, then the value of 
X. A is a generic instance of C; if the value of X.R(A) is 
the instance I, then the value of X. A is I. As with number 
attributes, reference attributes participate in the probabil­
ity model, and can depend on and be influenced by other 
attributes. We call this type of uncertainty "reference un­
certainty" because we do not know which object is being 
referred to when we refer to the value of A. 
A SPOOK knowledge base consists of a set of classes and 
instance models. In [KP98], we defined a data structure 
called a dependency graph that can be used to make sure 
that all the probabilistic influences, including the influences 
between different objects, are acyclic. We defined a se­
mantics for SPOOK models, based on a generative process 
that randomly generates values for attributes of instances 
in the domain, including number and reference attributes. 
We showed that if the dependency graph is acyclic, then 
the knowledge base defines a unique probability distribu­
tion over the values of all simple attributes of all named 
instances in the KB. 
3 Modeling the Battlespace Domain 
To demonstrate the representational power of the SPOOK 
language, we implemented a model for reasoning about 
military units in a battlespace. In [LM97], Mahoney and 
Laskey describe how they model this domain using net­
work fragments. In this section, we introduce the domain, 
discuss why it is difficult to model using BNs, and describe 
how we modeled it using SPOOK. 
The purpose of the battles pace model is to reason about the 
locations and status of military units based on intelligence 
reports. Our model deals specifically with missile battal­
ions, the batteries within those battalions, and the individ­
ual units - vehicles, radar emplacements, missile launch­
ers, etc. - within the batteries. A scenario consists of 
multiple battalions, some of which may be at the same lo­
cation. A battalion typically has four batteries, each with 
about 50 units. Thus, the model for a battalion includes 
about 200 units, and a scenario may include 1000 units. 
Let us consider trying to model our domain directly with 
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a BN. With four or five variables for each unit, a flat BN 
for a battalion model will typically contain over a thousand 
nodes. The sheer size of this network is a major obstacle to 
its construction. In addition, the resulting BN will be too 
rigid for practical purposes. The configuration of a battal­
ion is highly flexible, with the exact number of units of each 
type varying considerably between different battalions. 
These difficulties have led to an alternative approach, in 
which several different BN s are used, one for each aspect 
of the model. Figure !(a) shows a Bayesian network for an 
SA3 battalion. There are similar networks for other types 
of units, such as Scud battalions and batteries. Although a 
Scud battalion contains Scud batteries, the battalion model 
does not replicate all the details of the battery model; rather, 
it summarizes the status of all the batteries with nodes, in­
dicating the initial number of batteries, the number of dam­
aged batteries, and the current number. These summaries 
serve two purposes: to keep the network reasonably sim­
ple; and to account for changing model configuration by 
making the initial number of subunits a variable. 
A major disadvantage of this approach is that it is very 
difficult to reason between the different networks. The 
only way to reason from one network to another is to 
reach conclusions about the state of variables in one net­
work and assert them as evidence in the other network. 
For example, the only way to transfer conclusions from a 
battery to a battalion is to condition one of the summary 
nodes in the battalion model; going from one battery to an­
other requires conditioning the battalion model, reasoning 
about the battalion, and then conditioning the other bat­
tery model. This type of reasoning has no sound proba­
bilistic semantics. There is no way to combine evidence 
about multiple different units in a probabilistically coher­
ent manner. Furthermore, this type of reasoning between 
fragments must be performed by a human or a program. It 
requires some model of the relationship between the frag­
ments, e.g., that the status node of the battery model is re­
lated to the number-damaged-batteries node of the battalion 
model. Nowhere is this relationship made explicit. 
Another disadvantage is that multiple BNs do not allow us 
to take advantage of redundancy within a model and simi­
larities between models. For example, the battalion model 
in Figure I (a) contains many similar substructures, summa­
rizing groups of units of different kinds. In addition, differ­
ent battalions may all have substructures describing their 
locations, as shown in the bottom right corner of the figure. 
In the multiple BNs approach, the only mechanism for ex­
ploiting these redundancies is cut-and-paste. This makes it 
very hard to maintain these models, because each time one 
of the reused components is changed, it must be updated in 
all the different networks that use it. 
OOBNs solve the problems inherent in the multiple BN ap­
proach. By allowing a battalion to contain a battery as a 
sub-object, we can easily have the battalion model encom­
pass the complete models of the different batteries in it, 
which in turn contain complete models of their subunits, 
without making the battalion model impossibly complex. 
We can then reason between different objects in the part-of 
hierarchy in a probabilistically coherent manner. In addi­
tion, by allowing us to define a class hierarchy, OOBNs 
allow us to exploit the redundancy in the model. 
However, the language of OOBNs is quite restricted, in a 
way that is problematic in our domain. If we want to model 
the effect of a unit's location on the unit, we need to rep­
resent the relationship between the unit and its location. 
In our model, this was the only relationship that did not 
fall into the part-of hierarchy, but richer models of the bat­
tlespace domain require more sophisticated relationships, 
such as that between a unit supporting another unit. In 
addition, our domain requires multi-valued attributes and 
quantifiers. A battalion contains several batteries, and each 
battery contains several units of different types. The higher 
level objects do not depend directly on the individual lower 
level objects, but only on aggregate properties of the set of 
objects, expressed through quantifier attributes. The abil­
ity to create named instances and hook them together via 
relations is also important in our domain, as illustrated by 
the example from the previous section of two battalions in 
the same location. Finally, the battlespace domain contains 
a great deal of structural uncertainty, in particular number 
uncertainty over the number of subunits. One may also 
have reference uncertainty as to the location of a unit. 
SPOOK includes all the capabilities of OOBNs to repre­
sent part-of and class hierarchies, and also handles relations 
between objects, multi-valued attributes, named instances, 
and structural uncertainty, all of which cannot be expressed 
in OOBNs. Our SPOOK model of the battlespace do­
main includes a natural class hierarchy, with Military-Unit, 
Environment, Location and Weather as root classes. The 
Battalion, Battery, Group, and Unit families are all part of 
the Military-Unit hierarchy. Similarly, part-of relationships 
are easy to model in SPOOK using inverse relations. The 
has-battery attribute of a battalion, and the in-battalion at­
tribute of a battery, are inverses, allowing the battalion and 
its contained battery to influence each other. Batteries do 
not contain individual units directly, but instead contain a 
Group object for each type of unit. For instance, a battery 
has (among others) groups of missile launchers, command 
vehicles, and anti-aircraft artillery units. Each Group has a 
multi-valued attribute relating it to the individual units, as 
well as a number attribute and a set of quantifier attributes 
that summarize the status of the units. Using Group objects 
is convenient because we summarize the same attributes for 
all types of units. 
An object of class Unit has simple attributes reported, 
operational, damaged and reported-damaged. These attributes 
are influenced by the location of the battalion - specifi-
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Figure 1: (a) SA3 Battalion Bayesian network, (b) SPOOK model of Scud Battalion 
cally, the location's support for concealment and defense 
- and by the battalion being under fire. We repre­
sent these influences in SPOOK by specifying, for exam­
ple, at-location.defense-support as a parent of damaged. The 
number of damaged units in turn influences the battery's 
operational attribute, and a quantifier slot that counts the 
number of operational batteries in a battalion influences the 
battalion's current-activity. Subclassing gives us the ability 
to provide models for certain types of units that are sim­
ilar to the general unit model but not exactly the same. 
For instance, Missile-Launcher has an additional activity at­
tribute that indicates whether it is launching, reloading, or 
idle. While we only modeled the domain up to the battal­
ion level, we could easily extend our model to higher-level 
groups in the military hierarchy. 
In our current model, all units in a battalion share a com­
mon environment, which is referred to by the in-environment 
attribute of the battalion. The environment is composed of 
Location and Weather objects, which between them deter­
mine the current support of the environment for various ac­
tivities such as moving, hiding and launching missiles. We 
could have associated a different environment with each 
battery or unit, making locations of lower-level objects re­
lated probabilistically to higher level objects. 
To give an example of the power of reasoning at multiple 
levels of the hierarchy and between different objects, we 
present a series of queries we asked the model. First we 
queried the prior probability that a particular Scud battery 
was hit, and found it to be 0.06. We then observed that the 
containing battalion was under heavy fire, and the proba­
bility that the battery was hit went up to 0.44. We then 
observed, however, that none of the launchers in the bat­
tery had been reported to be damaged, and the probability 
that the battery was hit went down to 0.28. We then ex­
plained away this last observation, by observing that the 
environment has good support for hiding; the probability 
that the battery was hit went back up to 0.33. This example 
combines causal, evidential and intercausal reasoning, and 
involves battery and battalion objects, individual launcher 
objects, the launcher group, and the environment object. 
4 Inference 
In the previous sections we described the SPOOK language, 
and how we used it to model the battlespace awareness do­
main. Of course, in order for the language to be useful, 
we need an efficient algorithm for performing inference in 
it. Ideally, we would like the language features to lend 
themselves to efficient inference. Indeed, as we argued 
in [KP97], one of the measures of a successful represen­
tation language is that it makes the structure of the domain 
explicit, so that it can be exploited by an appropriately de­
signed inference algorithm. 
One way to perform inference in SPOOK is to use 
the technique of knowledge-based model construction 
(KBMC) [WBG92]. In this approach, we construct a BN 
that represents the same probability distribution as that de­
fined by our model, and answer queries in this BN using 
standard BN inference algorithms. We described the 
KBMC process for our language in detail in [KP98], and 
showed that if the dependency graph is acyclic, it always 
terminates. 
While the KBMC approach provides a sound and complete 
method for answering queries in SPOOK it is somewhat un­
satisfactory. It fails to exploit the language's ability to make 
explicit the structure of the domain. All notions of objects 
and relationships are lost when the model is turned into a 
fiat BN. In [KP97], we argued that the object structure of a 
model can and should be exploited for efficient inference. 
We argued that two aspects of the structure in particular 
should be exploited: the fact that the internal state of each 
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object is encapsulated from the remainder of the model via 
its interface, and that locality of interaction typically in­
duces small interfaces; and the fact that the same type of 
object may appear many times in a model. Since the flat 
BN produced by KBMC has no notion of an object, the 
KBMC algorithm cannot exploit these structural features. 
We now present an object-based inference algorithm that 
does exploit the structural features of a model. The algo­
rithm is based on the ideas presented in [KP97], but it is 
significantly more complex due to the increased expressiv­
ity of our language. The added complexity arises princi­
pally from four new language features. 
First, the "multi-centeredness" of the language implies that 
each object can be accessed by a multitude of other objects, 
in a variety of different ways. In OOBNs, we assumed that 
each type of object had a unique set of inputs and outputs, 
and that we could precompute a conditional distribution 
over the outputs given the inputs. This is no longer the case. 
Because an object can be accessed in many different ways, 
its outputs can be arbitrarily complex. In addition, its in­
puts are not fixed, but are determined by the way the object 
is accessed, and the particular set of outputs required, as 
will be explained below. Thus, for each object referred to 
by another object, our algorithm must determine its inputs 
and outputs on the fly, during the processing of a query. 
The second relevant language feature is the ability to cre­
ate instances and hook instances together via relations. As 
we shall explain later, this property implies that encapsu­
lation, although still present, no longer holds in exactly 
the same way as in OOBNs. The third feature is multi­
valued attributes and quantifier attributes that depend on 
them, which do not appear in OOBNs, and require a new 
treatment. 
The final complicating feature is structural uncertainty. The 
naive approach to dealing with structural uncertainty, that 
could be applied to OOBN models, is as follows. To com­
pute P(Q), enumerate all possible structural hypotheses h, 
and compute P(Q I h) for each such hypothesis. P(Q) is 
then equal to Lh P(h)P(Q I h). Unfortunately, the num­
ber of structural hypotheses is exponential in the number 
of structural variables, rendering this approach completely 
infeasible with more than a very small number of structural 
variables. In the battles pace awareness domain, the number 
of structural variables is large, since we have uncertainty 
over the number of units in many different groups. There­
fore we need a much better way of doing inference with 
structural uncertainty. 
Our inference algorithm is related to the KBMC algo­
rithms, but its recursive nature makes it quite different, so 
we describe it in detail. It is fairly complex, so we present 
it in stages. We begin with the basic algorithm, for class 
objects without multi-valued complex attributes, we then 
extend it to deal with instances, and finally we show how 
we deal with multi-valued attributes, quantifier attributes, 
number uncertainty and reference uncertainty. 
4.1 Basic algorithm 
Our inference algorithm is recursive. The main function 
of the algorithm answers a query on an object. The key 
to understanding the algorithm is to understand how the 
function is recursively called, and the relationship between 
the object calling the function and the object on which it is 
called. Suppose that, during the process of solving a query 
on an object X, we encounter a complex attribute D of X. 
For now, let us assume that D is single-valued. There is 
some object Y that is the value of X.D. Let us assume 
for now that no value is asserted in the knowledge base for 
X.D, so that Y is a generic (unnamed) instance of T(D). 
Recall that other attributes of X may depend on the value 
of D, i.e., on Y .  Specifically, let a1 , ... , CT n be the com­
plete set of attribute chains, such that attributes of X de­
pend on each of the Y. a; but on no other aspects of the 
value of Y .  In order to solve a query on X, we will need 
to solve a subquery on Y ,  to obtain a distribution over 
Y. a1, . . .  , Y. <Tn. Recall, however, that Y may itself depend 
on X. This will happen if D has an inverse E, so that the 
value of Y. E is X. Let r1, ... , T m be the complete set of 
attribute chains through which Y depends on X. The dis­
tribution over Y. a1, . . . , Y.CTn will depend on the values of 
X. r1, . . .  , X. r m. The subquery on Y needs to return a con­
ditional distribution over a1, ... , <Tn given r1, . . .  , Tm. The 
issue is further complicated by the fact that, while solving a 
query for object X, we do not yet know the set r1, . . .  , r m, 
through which Y depends on X. This information can only 
be computed within Y itself. Therefore, when answering 
the subquery on Y ,  we return not only the conditional dis­
tribution over a1, ... , <Tn, but also the conditioning vari­
ables T1, ... , Tm. 
The main function of our algorithm, SolveQuery, takes 
three arguments, one of which is optional. The two re­
quired arguments are an object Y ,  called the target of the 
query, and a set of attribute chains u = a1, ... , <Tn, called 
the outputs of the query. The optional argument is an at­
tribute E, called the entry point of the query; E is the entry 
point into Y ifY. E is X. The entry point is used for discov­
ering the dependencies of Y on X: Y depends on X. T only 
when some attribute in Y depends on B. r. In this case, T 
is said to be an input to the query. SolveQuery returns two 
values: the set of inputs T = r1, . . .  , r m to the query, and 
a conditional probability distribution over u given T. A 
query may have no entry point if it is the top-level call to 
SolveQuery or if it was called for an attribute D of X that 
has no inverse. In that case, Y cannot get inputs from X, 
so that T will be empty, and the distribution returned over 
u will be unconditional. 
The basic procedure of SolveQuery is as follows. 
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SolveQuery constructs a local BN, which it will eventu­
ally use to solve the query. The BN consists of nodes for 
each of the attributes of the query target Y, nodes for the 
inputs and outputs, and other nodes that help communicate 
between different attributes. In order to add a node to the 
network, we must complete four steps: create it, specify its 
range, specify its parents, and specify its conditional prob­
ability distribution (CPD). These steps are not always per­
formed together; in some cases, we cannot specify the CPD 
of a node at the time that it is created. 
SolveQuery begins with an initialization phase. First it cre­
ates a node v(A) in the network for every attribute A of Y. 
For each simple attribute A, we specify the range of v(A) 
to be the range of A. If A is complex, we want the range 
to be the product of all the attribute chains through which 
Y depends on A, but we do not yet know this set. For this 
reason, we maintain a set needed( A) for each complex at­
tribute A. 
Next, SolveQuery creates an output node v(output), to 
represent the query output. The range of v( output) is 
x�=l Dom(a;), where Dom(a;) is the range of the sim­
ple attribute at the end of the attribute chain a;. For each 
a;, we call the function GetChainNode (see below) to ob­
tain a node v(a;), whose range is Dom(a;), and make 
it a parent of v(output). The CPD for v(output) simply 
implements the cross-product operation: if the values of 
v(at), ... , v(an) are Vt, . .. , Vn, the value of v(output) is 
(vt, ... , vn) with probability I. 
GetChainNode is called whenever we need to produce a 
node to represent the value of an attribute chain a. If v(a) 
is already in the BN, we simply return it. This will always 
be the case if a is just a simple attribute A. Otherwise, a 
must have the form A.p, where A is a complex attribute. 
The algorithm thus needs to ensure that the processing of 
A will give the required information about A.p. We there­
fore add p to the set needed( A). We can extract the value 
from the output of A by creating a new projection node 
v(a), whose range is Dom(a), and set its lone parent to be 
v(A). As we will see below, the projection node performs 
the inverse operation to that of the cross-product node. 
The main phase of SolveQuery performs a backward­
chaining process to determine the interfaces of complex 
attributes. First, we order the attributes of Y in an order 
consistent with the dependency graph. Such an order must 
exist if the model is well-defined. We then process the at­
tributes one by one, in a bottom-up order. Children must 
precede their parents, since processing a child tells us what 
"information" we need from its parents. Processing a sim­
ple attribute A is easy. We simply obtain the set of attribute 
chain parents of A, as specified in the model of Y. For each 
such parent a, we convert it into a BN node v( a) by calling 
GetChainNode, and add it as a parent of v(A). We then 
set the CPD of v(A) as specified in the model ofY. 
Processing a complex attribute A requires a recursive call. 
If A is the entry point of the query, we ignore it- it gets 
special treatment later. If needed( A) is empty, we can sim­
ply prune A. Otherwise, we will need to ask a subquery to 
obtain a distribution over needed( A). For now, we assume 
that Y.A has no asserted value in the knowledge base, so 
that the value of Y.A is some unnamed instance Z of class 
T(A). Since the model of Z is the same as that of ev­
ery other unnamed instance of T(A), we can ask the sub­
query on the class object T(A). We therefore make a call to 
SolveQuery, in which the target is T(A) and the set of out­
puts is needed( A). In addition, if A has an inverse B, the 
entry point is B, otherwise there is no entry point. The call 
to SolveQuery will return a set of inputs r A, and a con­
ditional probability distribution over needed( A) given r A· 
We treat the inputs r A to A in the same way as the parents 
of a simple slot, using GetChainNode. We set the range 
of v(A) to be x,.Eneeded(A)Dom(a), and set the CPD of 
v( A) to be that returned by the recursive call. 
When we have finished processing all of the attributes, we 
can fill in the CPDs for the projection nodes. Each such 
node v( a) represents a component of the value of a com­
plex attribute A. We could not specify the CPDs for these 
nodes at the time they were created, since we did not yet 
know the range of v( A). Once all the nodes have been 
created, we simply set the CPD of v( a) to implement the 
projection function from x,.Eneeded(A)Dom(a) onto a. 
At this point, we have almost built the complete network 
for solving the query. Recall that we have not yet processed 
the entry point E. The node v(E) is the input node, repre­
senting the input of the query. We set the range of v(E) to 
be ITrEneeded(E) Dom(r). The node v(E) has no parents 
and no CPD. We are now done building the local BN for the 
object Y. If the knowledge base asserts a value v for a sim­
ple attribute A of Y, we assert the value of v(A) to be vas 
evidence in the network. We then use a standard BN algo­
rithm to compute the conditional probability of the output 
node given the input node, and return this conditional prob­
ability, along with the optional set of inputs needed( E). 
To summarize, let us consider how our algorithm exploits 
the two types of structure described in [KP97]. Each recur­
sive call computes a distribution over the interface between 
two related objects. The algorithm exploits the fact that all 
the internal details of the callee are encapsulated from the 
caller by the interface. Much of the work of the algorithm, 
in particular maintaining the needed() sets and returning 
the set of inputs r, is concerned with computing these in­
terfaces on the fly. 
As for exploiting the recurrence of the same type of ob­
ject many times in the model, observe that different calls to 
SolveQuery with the same set of arguments will always re­
turn the same value. In order to reuse computation between 
different objects of the same type, we maintain a cache, in-
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dexed by the three arguments to SolveQuery. Note that 
we cannot reuse computation between different queries on 
the same object, because they may generate very different 
computations down the line. However, if the two queries 
are similar, many of the recursive computations they gen­
erate will be the same, and we will be able to reuse those. 
4.2 Dealing with instances 
If an instance has a value asserted for one of its attributes, 
we can no longer use the generic class model for that in­
stance. In addition, if one instance is related to another, 
the internals of the two instances are not necessarily en­
capsulated from each other. Consider, for example, three 
instances I, J and K, such that !. A = J, I.E = K, and 
J.C = K. In this case K is not encapsulated from I by 
J. Hence, the interface between I and J does not separate 
the internals of I from the internals of J. When answering 
a query on I, we cannot simply perform a recursive call to 
obtain a distribution over the interface between I and J, as 
we would lose the fact that the internals of I and J may 
be correlated by their mutual dependence on K. A possi­
ble solution to this problem is to include K in the interface 
between I and J. However, including entire objects in an 
interface creates huge interfaces, and defeats the purpose 
of using an object-based inference algorithm. 
In order to deal with this issue, we create a new top-level 
object 7 in the knowledge base. This object contains an 
attribute !:: A for every named instance I and each of its 
attributes A. If A is simple, Dom(I : : A) = Dom(A); if it 
is complex, T (I: : A) = T (A). If the KB asserts a value 
for !. A, /: : A  has the same value. Every user query will 
be directed through the top-level object. More precisely, 
a user query will have the form I.u = ft.CJ1, . . .  ,ln. CJn, 
where each Ii is an instance (not necessarily distinct), and 
CJi is an attribute chain on Ii. The query is answered using 
a call SolveTopLevel(/, I.u). Since this is the top-level 
query, there is no entry point, and we will simply return a 
distribution over I.u. 
SolveTopLevel is very similar to SolveQuery, so we omit 
the details. The main difference is in the way attribute 
chains are treated. On the top level, all attribute chains are 
attached to an instance. This is true both for the attribute 
chains required in the query output, and for the parents of 
any top-level attribute !:: A. We replace GetChainNode 
with a function GetTopLeveiChainNode that takes two ar­
guments : an instance and an attribute chain. This function 
behaves similarly to GetChainNode, except for one situ­
ation. If the chain CJ is of the form A. p, and !. A = J, 
then l. A. CJ  = J. p. The algorithm eliminates this step of 
indirection, and continues to follow the rest of the chain. 
4.3 Multi-valued attributes & structural uncertainty 
We first show how to perform inference with multi-valued 
attributes with no number uncertainty. Let A be a multi­
valued complex attribute with n values. One way to per­
form inference with multi-valued attributes is to replace 
A with an array of n single-valued attributes AI, . . .  , An. 
Now consider a quantifier Q = #(A. p = v). The value 
of Q depends on the values of A1. p, .. . , An . p. We there­
fore introduce a projection node for each of the Ai . p, and 
p is added to needed(Ai)· The CPT for v(Q) is defined to 
count the number of v(Ai·P) whose value is v. 
The problem with this approach is that v(Q) has n parents, 
so its CPT has size exponential in n. A better solution uses 
the fact that the value of v( Q) does not depend directly on 
each of the individual v(Ai.p), but only on the number of 
them that have the value v. Therefore, we do not need to 
introduce the v( Ai . p) explicitly. Given the probability p 
that a single Ai·P has the value v, the probability that k out 
of n have the value v is given simply by the binomial term 
G)Pk(1 - p)n-k We can compute the CPT for v(Q) in 
time O(n2), using a recurrence relation. Let Pm(Q = k) 
denote the probability that k out of the first A1. p, . . .  , Am . p  
have value v. Then P0(Q = 0) = 1, and Pm+I(Q = k) = 
(1- p)Pm(Q = k) + pPm(Q = k- 1). 
If there are multiple quantifiers QI, . . .  , Qe, where Qi = 
#(A. pi = vi) ,  the situation is a little more complicated, 
but similar. Since, for a particular value of A, the Pi may 
not be independent of each other, the different quantifiers 
are also not independent of each other, and we need to 
compute a joint distribution over all of them. We begin 
by making a recursive call to SolveQuery for A, where 
needed( A) = {pi, . . .  , pt}. This gives us a distribution 
over the values of the Pi for a single value of A. We can 
encode the contribution of a single value of A to the quan­
tifiers in a vector of length£, in which the j-th component 
is I if Ai ·Pi = vi, 0 otherwise. The distribution over the 
2e such contributions can be computed from the result of 
the recursive call to SolveQuery. Let Pc. denote the com­
puted probability of the contribution C. Similarly, each joint 
value of the quantifier variables can be encoded by a vector 
of£ components, where each component is between 0 and 
n. We can then use a similar recurrence relation to the one 
above to compute the joint distribution over the values of 
all the quantifiers: 
i'E{O,l}' ,k' E{O, ... ,m}' 
k=C+k1 
We need to compute O((n + 1)i+1) summations, and each 
one involves 0(2e) terms, so the time to compute the joint 
distribution over the quantifiers is 0((2(n + 1))i+1 ) .  
This computation is accomplished within the framework of 
SolveQuery by setting the range of v(A) to be the set of 
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possible values of the quantifiers. In the above discussion, 
we assumed that A has no inputs. If it does, we of course 
have to perform the above computation for each value of 
the inputs.We then set the CPT for v(A) to choose the com­
puted joint probability distribution over the Q j given each 
value of the inputs of A. Finally, the CPT for v( Q j) simply 
computes a projection from the range of v(A). 
As mentioned earlier, we· cannot deal with structural un­
certainty by reasoning about all possible structures. In­
stead, we need to exploit the fact that many of the structural 
variables do not interact. Each of the complete structural 
hypotheses can be decomposed into many independent or 
conditionally independent sub-hypotheses. For example, 
the numbers of units of different types in a battery may all 
be independent of each other given the country to which 
the battery belongs. This type of reasoning about the con­
ditional independence between different hypotheses is ide­
ally performed in a BN. We need to express all possible 
structures within a single network, so that the BN inference 
algorithm can exploit these independencies. 
This can be accomplished quite simply for number uncer­
tainty in the above framework. We add v( #A) as a parent 
of v(A). In the above recurrence relations, Pm(Q = k) is 
the probability that the contributions of the first m values 
of A to the set of quantifiers will total k. This is exactly 
the probability we need to use if the value of v( #A) = m. 
So the entire CPT for v(A) with number uncertainty can be 
computed in the same time as above. 
We deal with reference uncertainty as follows. Let A be 
a complex attribute with reference uncertainty. For each 
value v in the range of R.(A), we create an attribute Av, 
and a corresponding BN node v(Av). If vis equal to the 
type C, we set the type of Av to be C. This operation en­
sures that Av will later be processed correctly, as a generic 
attribute of type C. If v is equal to the instance I, we set the 
value of Av to be I. In this case, Av will be processed as a 
named instance. While we do not know the actual value of 
A, introducing all these nodes into the network accounts 
for all possible hypotheses over its value. We can now 
deal with dependencies on A. Consider a projection node 
v(A.p). We introduce a set of projection nodes v(Av.p) 
for each value v of R.(A). We make v(A.p) depend on all 
the v(Av·P) as well as on R.(A), and set its CPO to select 
the value of the parent specified by R.(A). We can think 
of the CPO of v(A.p) as implementing a multiplexer, with 
selector R.(A). (See [BFGK96] for a similar construction.) 
5 Experimental Results 
We have implemented the SPOOK system for representing 
models in the SPOOK language, and performing inference 
on these models. At the core of the system is a module 
containing the data structures necessary to represent the 
SPOOK data model. On top of this module is a user in-
Figure 2: Experimental results 
terface (see Figure 1 (b)) in which the user can create class 
and instance objects, build probability models, observe val­
ues and query probabilities. SPOOK models can also be 
stored in an external knowledge server such as Ontolingua. 
SPOOK communicates with the knowledge server using the 
OKBC protocol [CFF+98], a generic protocol for commu­
nication between knowledge-based systems. Inference can 
be performed in SPOOK either by using the KBMC algo­
rithm, or the object-based inference algorithm described in 
Section 4. Both inference methods use the same home­
grown underlying BN inference engine. 
In our experiments, we compared the performance of the 
object-based algorithm with the KBMC algorithm on mod­
els of different sizes. Each model consists of a single bat­
talion with four batteries, each containing I I  groups of dif­
ferent kinds with the number of units in each group varying 
from I to 9. The model also contains objects for the envi­
ronment, location and weather, as described in Section 3. 
The size of the constructed BN grows linearly in the num­
ber of units per group, and varies from 750 to 5500 nodes. 
In order to measure separately the benefits from exploit­
ing interfaces and from reusing computation, we tried two 
different versions of the object-based algorithm, with and 
without reuse. We also compared the naive and combina­
toric approaches to dealing with multivalued attributes de­
scribed in Section 4.3. Figure 2 shows the running time 
in seconds of the different algorithms. From the graph, 
we see that all versions of the object-based algorithm out­
perform the KBMC algorithm by a large margin, and that 
the algorithm with reuse outperforms the algorithm with­
out reuse. For example, with four units per group, the 
object-based algorithm with reuse takes 9 seconds, without 
reuse takes 46 seconds, while the KBMC algorithm takes 
1292 seconds. In addition, we see that for the combina­
toric approach to number uncertainty, the inference cost 
hardly increases with the number of units per group (its 
performance curve is just above the x-axis). Even with 10 
units per group, the cost of inference topped out at I I  sec­
onds, whereas for the naive approach we see an exponential 
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blowup as we increase the number of units per group. 
The reason for the great disparity between the inference 
times for the flat BN and for the object-based algorithm 
without reuse, is that the BN reasoning algorithm is fail­
ing to find optimal junction trees in the flat BN. The 
largest clique constructed for the flat BN contains 18 nodes, 
whereas the largest clique over all of the local BN compu­
tations for the structured algorithm contains only 8 nodes. 
The BN inference engine uses the standard minimum dis­
crepancy triangulation heuristic to construct the junction 
tree. We see that at least for a standard BN implementation, 
exploiting object structure and the small interfaces between 
objects is vital to scaling up inference. While algorithms 
do exist for computing optimal triangulations [SG97], most 
implementations of Bayes nets do not use them, and these 
algorithms do not address the issue of reuse. 
6 Discussion 
An alternative approach to ours to modeling large, com­
plex domains probabilistically is the network fragments ap­
proach of Laskey and Mahoney [LM97]. They provide net­
work fragments for different aspects of a model, and oper­
ations for combining the fragments to produce more com­
plex models. Network fragments exploit the same types of 
domain structure as do OOBNs. Because they allow com­
plex fragments to be constructed out of simpler ones, they 
allow models to be composed hierarchically. Similarly, be­
cause they allow the same fragment to be reused multiple 
times, they exploit the redundancy in the domain. 
The main difference between the two approaches is that 
ours focuses on building structured models, while theirs fo­
cuses on exploiting the domain structure for the knowledge 
engineering process, but the constructed models them­
selves are unstructured. An analogy from programming 
languages is that network fragments are like macros, which 
are preprocessed and substituted into the body of a pro­
gram before compilation. SPOOK class models, on the 
other hand, are like defined functions, which become part 
of the structure of the compiled program. The advantages 
of the two approaches are comparable to those of their pro­
gramming language analogues. Network fragments, like 
macros, have the advantage of flexibility, since no assump­
tions need be made about the relationship between com­
bined fragments. For example, the restriction of OOBNs to 
part-of relationships was never an issue in the network frag­
ment approach. The SPOOK language, on the other hand, 
provides a stricter, more semantic approach to combining 
models. Like structured programming languages, it allows 
strong type-checking in the definition of models. 
The most important advantage of the SPOOK approach is 
that the models are themselves structured. The domain 
structure can then be exploited for efficient inference, as 
explained in Section 4. As our experimental results in 
Section 5 show, exploiting the domain structure can lead 
to great computational savings. In addition, because the 
domain structure is an explicit part of the model, we can 
now integrate uncertainty over the structure directly into 
the probability model. 
SPOOK provides a bridge between probabilistic reasoning 
and traditional logic-based knowledge representation. Be­
cause it utilizes explicit notions of objects and the relation­
ships between them, SPOOK is able to incorporate and aug­
ment the relational models used in many KR systems. This 
capability is enhanced by the ability of sPOOK to commu­
nicate with such systems through the OKBC protocol. 
Our experiences with SPOOK are encouraging. Our hypoth­
esis that exploiting the object structure of a domain can 
help both in knowledge representation and inference seems 
to be correct. Of course, we have only worked with one 
domain, and it remains to be seen if the advantages carry 
over to other domains. If they do, perhaps the door will be 
opened to a wide range of new and more complex applica­
tions of Bayesian network tecnhology. 
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